Onur Cobanli Proposes Ministry of Advanced Design for Permanent Government Innovation
A Peer Reviewed Open Access Study Presenting Evidence Based Mechanisms for Governments to Systematically Measure, Redesign and Continuously Improve Public Services
TL;DR
Governments lack competitive pressure, so services stagnate. This peer-reviewed research proposes a permanent Ministry of Advanced Design to systematically measure every government procedure, pilot improvements before rollout, and deliver services proactively rather than waiting for citizens to apply.
Key Takeaways
- Permanent ministry rank with recursive self-improvement mandate addresses why temporary innovation labs fail after political transitions
- Five mechanisms including public procedure registers and proactive service delivery enable systematic government improvement
- Democratic boundaries remain intact by separating policy authority from implementation authority over service quality
What if the largest service provider in every country approached improvement with the same systematic rigor that manufacturing companies bring to product development? Every major corporation maintains a research and development department because leaders understand that products left unexamined eventually become obsolete. Yet governments, which operate service portfolios touching every citizen from birth to death, rarely maintain permanent institutions whose sole mission is making government itself work better. The asymmetry between private sector research investment and absent public sector improvement institutions sits at the heart of a peer-reviewed research paper authored by Onur Cobanli, who proposes something genuinely novel: a Ministry of Advanced Design, Research and Development as a permanent fixture of national governance.
The Ministry of Advanced Design concept arrives at an opportune moment. Public administrations worldwide are grappling with aging infrastructure, rising citizen expectations, and the persistent challenge of delivering services efficiently to populations that include the very young, the very old, and everyone navigating complex life transitions in between. The research draws on comparative analysis and literature synthesis to present a comprehensive institutional design framework that moves beyond temporary innovation initiatives toward something far more ambitious and durable.
For government officials, academic researchers studying public administration, and enterprises that interact regularly with regulatory systems, the research offers a detailed blueprint worth examining closely. The framework addresses a fundamental question that policy makers and scholars have circled for decades: how can the public sector achieve continuous improvement when the competitive pressures that drive private sector innovation simply do not exist? The answer, according to Cobanli's research, lies in building the right institution first.
The Structural Challenge Governments Face Without Competitive Pressure
Understanding why government services often remain static requires examining a concept economists have studied extensively. When citizens need a passport, register a vehicle, or file taxes, they cannot choose an alternative provider. The absence of choice removes the natural corrective force that shapes private markets. A restaurant serving mediocre food loses customers to competitors, but a licensing office serving the same mediocre experience faces no comparable exodus.
Herbert Simon, the Nobel laureate who defined the science of design in universal terms, argued that anyone who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones engages in design work. Simon specifically noted that the intellectual activity producing a social welfare policy does not differ fundamentally from the activity producing material artifacts. Government procedures, by Simon's definition, are design problems deserving design solutions.
The costs of leaving administrative design problems unaddressed accumulate substantially over time. The research cites evidence that tax compliance alone consumes nearly two percent of gross domestic product in major economies when measuring both hours spent and out-of-pocket expenses. Studies indicate that a significant majority of government technology budgets go toward maintaining existing systems rather than building improvements. Administrative burdens fall disproportionately on populations with the fewest resources to navigate complexity, creating a pattern where those who most need government services face the highest barriers to accessing those services.
The structural challenge of absent competitive pressure explains why episodic reform efforts, however well-intentioned, tend to produce temporary gains rather than lasting transformation. The research establishes the competitive pressure foundation not to criticize existing efforts but to illuminate why a different institutional approach merits consideration.
Why Temporary Innovation Initiatives Encounter Sustainability Challenges
The past two decades have witnessed a global flourishing of public sector innovation laboratories, digital service units, and behavioral science teams embedded within governments. Academic mapping efforts have identified dozens of innovation organizations across multiple continents. Innovation initiatives have generated documented value, including substantial savings, improved service delivery times, and higher rates of citizen compliance with tax obligations.
Yet the research highlights a pattern worth understanding. Several prominent innovation laboratories have ceased operations following shifts in political priorities. The world's first and most widely studied public sector innovation lab operated successfully for sixteen years before closing. A digital service team that completed hundreds of projects for numerous government agencies was eliminated despite documented contributions from the team. Academic researchers studying the lifecycle of cross-departmental laboratories have observed that chief executive support represents the most significant survival factor, and the loss of executive support through political transitions frequently triggers closure.
The pattern of innovation laboratory closures carries important implications for how governments might approach institutional design. Fragments of innovation capacity exist at various scales across many governments. What remains absent, according to the research analysis, is an institution combining three specific properties: permanent ministry rank that survives political transitions, whole-of-government scope covering every institution and procedure, and a recursive mandate requiring the improving institution to measure and improve itself.
The research treats one apparent counterexample with scholarly honesty. A celebrated digital government built the first generation of digital services through informal cooperative networks rather than formal institutional structures. The leading academic case study of the informal network success, however, concludes that the same informal foundations now face challenges sustaining improvement across political generations. The lesson drawn is instructive: informality can build a first generation, while permanence requires institutions.
The Ministry Concept and Its Self-Improving Design
The proposed Ministry of Advanced Design operates one continuous cycle: measure every government procedure, research causes of cost and delay and error, redesign, pilot at small scale, roll out what survives evidence testing, monitor outcomes, and repeat indefinitely. The mandate covers every institution and every procedure of the state, from local government offices to national ministries to digital government services.
What distinguishes the Ministry of Advanced Design proposal from previous reform concepts is the recursive requirement. The ministry must publish the same metrics about ministry operations that the ministry demands from every other institution. The recursive requirement serves a specific purpose. An institution demanding efficiency from other agencies while exempting itself from scrutiny loses legitimacy rapidly. The recursive mandate also addresses a documented pattern in which responses to government failures often involve spending more resources and adding additional layers rather than evaluating why existing structures did not prevent the failure initially.
The internal organizational template draws on research examining high-performing public research organizations. Key elements include organizational flexibility, significant authority given to program directors, and evaluation based on published outcome metrics. The ministry houses design teams led by empowered directors on fixed terms, staffed by multidisciplinary professionals combining service design, operations research, behavioral science, software engineering, statistics, and related disciplines.
Within accepted taxonomies of public sector innovation, which distinguish service innovation, administrative process innovation, technological process innovation, conceptual innovation, and governance innovation, the ministry institutionalizes administrative and technological process innovation as a permanent state function. The proposal builds upon scholarly work arguing that earlier waves of public management reform had stalled, and that reintegration, needs-based holism, and digitization represent productive paths forward.
Five Mechanisms That Enable Continuous Improvement
The research specifies five concrete mechanisms through which the ministry would operate. Each mechanism addresses a particular dimension of the improvement challenge.
The Public Procedure Register
The first mechanism establishes a public procedure register. Currently, no one can state definitively, for any country, how many government procedures exist, how long each procedure takes, what each procedure costs, and how often each procedure produces errors. The register repairs the absence of comprehensive procedure data by cataloging every procedure with measured completion time, citizen hours consumed, unit cost, step count, error rate, and satisfaction score, published openly and refreshed continuously. League tables built on the register create internal competitive pressure that would otherwise not exist. Sunset review processes can delete procedures unable to justify measured costs. The procedures performing most poorly receive ministry redesign assistance first.
Life Event Redesign Under a Once-Only Data Rule
The second mechanism reorganizes services around life events under a once-only data rule. The once-only principle requires citizens and businesses to supply the same information only once to a public administration, with subsequent agencies reusing the information rather than requesting the information again. Working implementations have generated measured value, including one national bereavement service that saves substantial resources annually by sharing data across organizations. The design destination progresses along three dimensions of data collection, data storage, and data use toward what researchers have termed a no-stop shop, in which citizens perform no action and complete no form to receive services for which they qualify.
Proactive Service Delivery
The third mechanism inverts the direction of service delivery from pull to push. Proactive government identifies citizens eligible for benefits and delivers benefits without requiring applications. Working examples exist across multiple continents. One national system has issued family allowances automatically upon the birth of a child since 2015, with no citizen action required. Another national system transitioned family benefits to proactive delivery, resulting in parents receiving proposals from government rather than completing applications. Before the redesign, only a small fraction of benefits were offer-based and manual processing consumed substantial time per application. After implementation, nearly all registered births are checked automatically for eligibility. The equity implications are explicit: proactive services help ensure vulnerable groups do not miss benefits through lack of awareness, confusion, or stigma.
Pilot-First Policy Engineering
The fourth mechanism requires piloting before national rollout. Large public projects encounter a specific, statistically documented failure pattern involving extreme cost and schedule overruns. Research examining over a thousand projects found that average overrun figures mask a more significant danger, with a meaningful fraction of projects experiencing severe control failures. The procedural countermeasure is straightforward: nothing rolls out nationally without a small pilot, randomized where feasible, and every deployment carries a mandatory post-implementation review with rollback authority. Government experimentation at scale is established practice, with documented examples demonstrating that piloted interventions can produce substantial returns at minimal cost.
Shared Infrastructure and Upstream Law Design
The fifth mechanism establishes shared infrastructure and upstream law design. When every agency separately procures identity verification, payment processing, notification systems, and data exchange capabilities, costs and failure rates multiply. The alternative provides shared components and common infrastructure supporting efficiency and reuse. Working implementations have handled enormous query volumes while saving substantial personnel time annually. The mechanism also operates upstream, before laws are born. One national government has required since 2018 that all new legislation before parliament be assessed for digital implementation consequences, with a secretariat reviewing legislative proposal summaries months before public consultation. Inside the Ministry of Advanced Design, legislative review attaches complexity cost estimates to every bill, addressing bureaucratic growth at the source rather than attempting demolition after construction.
Empowerment Instruments and Democratic Boundaries
The research addresses directly the question of how the ministry would possess sufficient authority to effect change without overstepping democratic boundaries. Advisory bodies lacking enforcement mechanisms tend to be ignored, and the historical record of innovation unit closures illustrates what happens when improvement efforts depend solely on persuasion.
Four administrative instruments provide the ministry with enforceable standing:
- Measurement rights establish a legal entitlement to operational data from any government procedure, providing the fuel for the public register.
- Binding service standards establish floor requirements for speed, error rates, accessibility, and data reuse that agencies must meet.
- A design review gate prevents new administrative systems and procedures from receiving funding before passing ministry review, generalizing successful precedents in which spending controls produced documented savings.
- A publication duty requires that every metric the ministry computes about other agencies, and about the ministry itself, becomes public by default.
The democratic boundary receives equally explicit treatment. Elected governments retain full authority over policy goals: what to provide, to whom, at what generosity. The ministry holds authority only over implementation quality: how fast, how affordably, how accurately, how humanely the chosen policy is delivered. The division between policy authority and implementation authority addresses concentration-of-power concerns structurally, preserving the essential distinction between political decisions about social priorities and technical decisions about operational execution.
The research notes that improvement methods transplanted as toolkits without institutional homes tend to fail. Implementation approaches focused on technical tools without an overarching logic to validate the tools struggle to gain traction. A permanent institution carries the logic; scattered projects cannot maintain coherence across time.
Anticipated Outcomes and Evaluation Framework
The research presents expected outcomes as testable hypotheses rather than guaranteed results, an approach that merits appreciation for intellectual honesty. Outcome variables derive directly from the procedure register: citizen hours per life event, unit transaction costs, error rates, and take-up rates, with channel-cost ratios and compliance-hour totals serving as benchmarks.
Anticipated magnitudes draw on existing research estimating substantial recoverable administrative waste as a percentage of public spending. Take-up rates for proactively delivered entitlements could move toward benchmarks established by programs engineered from inception to minimize claimant effort, which achieve near-complete take-up because administration tracks eligibility and calculates benefits automatically.
The research also identifies a trust hypothesis measurable through existing cross-national survey instruments fielding tens of thousands of responses across dozens of countries. Survey instruments measure reliability, responsiveness, integrity, openness, and fairness, which correspond to the dimensions the ministry mechanisms target. The research treats the trust dividend as a testable proposition rather than a certainty, acknowledging academic debate about the causal relationship between service performance and political trust.
Open parameters for national adaptation include constitutional rank versus statutory agency status, phasing of the four empowerment instruments, the legal basis of measurement rights under national data protection frameworks, and variations appropriate for small states versus federal systems. Those seeking deeper engagement with the mechanisms, evidence base, and implementation considerations can explore the complete ministry of advanced design research through the openly accessible publication.
Applications Across Governance Contexts
The framework offers relevance across diverse governance contexts. National governments facing fiscal pressures find value in systematically identifying and eliminating redundant administrative processes. Regional and local governments, which individually often cannot afford sophisticated administrative systems, benefit from shared infrastructure components that achieve economies of scale. Academic institutions studying public administration gain a comprehensive framework for analyzing government improvement efforts comparatively. Enterprises interacting regularly with regulatory systems benefit when regulatory systems operate more predictably and efficiently.
The research positions the ministry as the capability every subsequent reform presupposes. Any ambitious public project, whether fiscal, digital, or social, is fundamentally an act of institutional design, and acts of design proceed more successfully with a designer. The build-order argument suggests constructing the ministry first creates the foundation upon which other improvements can build.
For universities and research institutions, the framework opens productive avenues for empirical study. How do the five mechanisms interact in practice? Which empowerment instruments prove most consequential in different governance contexts? What adaptation strategies succeed in federal versus unitary states? The research provides a theoretical architecture that subsequent empirical work can test and refine.
Closing Reflections
The research authored by Onur Cobanli contributes a genuinely novel institutional design proposal to the scholarly literature on public administration and government innovation. By combining permanent ministry rank, whole-of-government scope, and a recursive self-improvement mandate, the framework addresses structural factors that have limited the durability of previous reform efforts. The five delivery mechanisms and four empowerment instruments provide concrete operational specificity that moves beyond abstract principles toward implementable architecture.
Time returned to citizens through more efficient government services represents life returned to citizens. The question facing governments, academic institutions, and enterprises alike is whether the documented costs of administrative complexity warrant the institutional investment required to address administrative complexity systematically. What would governance look like if the institution responsible for improving institutions existed in every country?